Introduction:

The issue of rape cases registered on the premise of a false promise of marriage has long been a point of contention in Indian jurisprudence. The debate centers on whether consent in such cases can be vitiated by the promise of marriage, and to what extent the legal framework accounts for the agency of women in these circumstances. The introduction of Section 69 in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023 has added a new dimension to this debate, distinguishing it from the traditional definition of rape under the Indian Penal Code (IPC). This essay aims to critically examine the judicial limitations imposed on such cases and the implications of Section 69 in addressing false promises of marriage in the context of sexual offences.

Body:

1. Judicial Limitations on False Promise of Marriage Cases:

The judicial approach to rape cases based on false promises of marriage has evolved over time, with the Supreme Court providing specific guidelines to narrow the scope of such accusations. One key limitation is the distinction between a false promise of marriage and a breach of promise. In the landmark case of Anurag Soni v. The State of Chhattisgarh (2019), the Court ruled that merely making a promise to marry, even if not fulfilled, does not amount to rape unless there was no intention from the outset to fulfill the promise. The case underlined that the accused’s intent at the time of making the promise is crucial.

Further, the Court in Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. (2025) clarified that prolonged consensual physical relationships could not automatically be attributed to a false promise, especially if the complainant’s actions were motivated by factors like love or passion, rather than deceit. The Abhishek Arjariya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025) case reinforced this principle, holding that if the woman was already married, her consent in the context of a false promise was not vitiated under misconception of fact.

2. Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023:

Section 69 of the BNS was introduced to address cases of sexual intercourse resulting from a false promise of marriage. However, it has been critiqued for its potential redundancy. Section 69 defines the offence of sexual intercourse under a false promise of marriage, categorizing it as a separate offence with lesser punishment compared to rape under Section 63 of the BNS or Section 375 of the IPC. However, this provision does not alter the underlying principles of consent as defined in the IPC, which already includes “misconception of fact” as a ground for vitiating consent.

The main issue with Section 69 lies in its redundancy—since a false promise of marriage can already be considered a misconception of fact under the existing rape laws. The absence of a non-obstante clause and the failure to carve out an exception in Section 63 to exclude such cases from the definition of rape makes Section 69 constitutionally questionable. This could potentially violate the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution, as it creates an artificial distinction between rape and cases involving false promises of marriage, despite their commonalities.

3. The Way Forward:

To address the limitations and potential redundancy of Section 69, a more nuanced approach should be adopted. A preliminary inquiry mechanism should be instituted before charging an individual in cases involving false promises of marriage. This would help in distinguishing cases of deceit from those involving genuine intentions that failed due to unforeseen circumstances. It would also save time for courts and prevent unnecessary hardship to the accused.

Additionally, a clearer legislative framework is needed to reconcile the provisions of Section 69 with the existing rape laws, possibly by explicitly excluding these cases from the scope of rape under the IPC or by introducing a more specific category of offence. This would ensure that the law provides clarity and fairness, without diluting the seriousness of sexual offences.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, while the introduction of Section 69 of the BNS was intended to address the issue of sexual intercourse based on false promises of marriage, it raises significant concerns about redundancy and constitutional validity. The judicial limitations in cases involving false promises of marriage highlight the importance of distinguishing between genuine misunderstandings and deliberate deceit. To ensure justice and fairness, a more refined legislative approach is required, one that balances the protection of women’s rights with the need for clear and effective legal provisions. By establishing a preliminary inquiry process and refining the scope of Section 69, the legal system can better address these complex cases while safeguarding the rights of both the accused and the victim.

Linking to Syllabus and Previous Years’ Questions:

This topic is relevant to the General Studies Paper II of the UPSC Mains, particularly in the areas of Governance, Constitution, Polity, Social Justice, and International Relations. It involves the intersection of law, gender justice, and constitutional rights, which has been a recurring theme in previous years’ papers.

Previous Years’ Questions:

• “Critically examine the need for reforms in the law relating to rape in India. What role does consent play in these reforms?” (2022)
• “Discuss the judicial approach towards the interpretation of rape laws in India, with emphasis on consent and misconception of facts.” (2020)
• “Examine the constitutional validity of new criminal provisions in the light of judicial precedents.” (2018)