Introduction

The imposition of a 25% reciprocal tariff and an additional 25% penal levy by the United States on India’s exports in August 2025 marks a significant strain on bilateral trade relations. While India maintains a merchandise trade surplus with the U.S. ($41.18 billion in 2024–25), these measures—linked partly to India’s continued import of Russian crude—have the potential to dent GDP growth, widen the Current Account Deficit (CAD), and create adverse spillovers for inflation and the exchange rate. In the broader perspective, they signal the increasing use of tariffs as instruments of geopolitical pressure, challenging the principles of free and fair trade.

Body

  1. Immediate Economic Impact
  • Trade Balance:
    • Reciprocal tariffs can reduce exports to the U.S. by up to 25% (assuming elasticity of -1).
    • This could widen the trade deficit by 0.56% of GDP (to 7.84%).
  • Growth Rate:
    • Base case GDP growth for 2024–25: 6.5%.
    • With tariffs, GDP growth could drop by ~0.6 percentage points to 5.9% (0.4% drop in 2025–26 considering elapsed months).
  • Current Account Deficit:
    • CAD may rise from 0.6% to 1.15% of GDP.
  • Oil Import Costs:
    • Penal levy acts as an indirect non-tariff barrier on Russian oil, forcing costlier imports from the U.S./others, with inflationary implications.
  1. Mitigating Factors and Caveats
  • Trade Diversification Efforts:
  • Recent trade pact with the UK; ongoing negotiations with EU and others could offset part of the CAD rise.
  • Competitor Tariffs:
  • If U.S. imposes similar tariffs on other competing exporters, India’s losses may moderate.
  • Exchange Rate Depreciation:
  • Rupee at ₹87.5/USD could make exports more competitive, partially offsetting tariff impact.
  1. Medium-Term Risks
  • Sustained tariff regime could structurally depress export competitiveness.
  • Greater dependence on high-cost crude could exacerbate CAD and fuel inflation.
  • Potential spillover to investment sentiment, especially in manufacturing sectors reliant on U.S. markets.
  1. Policy Options for India
  2. a) Trade Negotiation and Diplomacy
  • Use the three-week negotiation window to seek exemptions on key export categories.
  • Highlight inequity—several nations import more from Russia yet escape such penalties.
  • Build coalitions with like-minded economies at WTO and other forums.
  1. b) Domestic Tariff Reforms
  • Review import tariffs on inputs critical to export manufacturing.
  • Empirical evidence: higher import tariffs negatively impact export growth, especially with rising import content in exports.
  1. c) Market Diversification
  • Intensify outreach to ASEAN, Africa, Latin America for non-U.S. export opportunities.
  • Leverage FTAs under negotiation to widen market access.
  1. d) Strategic Energy Sourcing
  • Expand long-term contracts with Middle Eastern and African suppliers.
  • Accelerate domestic renewable energy capacity to reduce crude import dependence.

Conclusion

The U.S.’s reciprocal tariffs and penal levies may lower India’s GDP growth by over 0.6 percentage points in the current year and widen the CAD significantly. While immediate macroeconomic impact may be partly cushioned by new trade agreements and rupee depreciation, a sustained tariff-based trade regime would undermine India’s long-term export competitiveness. India’s response must blend strategic trade negotiations, tariff rationalisation, market diversification, and energy security measures to safeguard growth and external stability in an increasingly protectionist global trade environment.

Previous Year UPSC Mains Questions

  • 2023 (GS 3): “How do trade wars impact emerging economies like India? Discuss with suitable examples.”
  • 2020 (GS 3): “Examine the implications of protectionist policies on India’s trade and growth prospects.”
  • 2018 (GS 3): “How does trade policy impact the current account balance of a country? Illustrate with India’s recent experience.”

Introduction

India’s electoral democracy is premised on universal adult suffrage under Article 326 of the Constitution, supported by the Representation of the People (RP) Act, 1950. However, the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Bihar’s electoral rolls has triggered concerns about disenfranchisement of migrant workers, many of whom find their names deleted from their native constituency rolls due to the “ordinarily resident” requirement. With 11% of India’s population migrating for employment-related reasons (PLFS 2020–21), this issue has deep implications for political representation, social justice, and federal harmony.

Body

  1. Legal Provisions and Judicial Interpretation
  • Section 19, RP Act, 1950: Requires an elector to be “ordinarily resident” in the constituency.
  • Section 20: Temporary absence does not remove ordinary residence; ownership of property alone is insufficient.
  • Section 20A (2010): Extends voting rights to NRIs at the passport address constituency.
  • Judicial View: Gauhati HC (1999) held that “ordinary residence” implies habitual, permanent character and intent to dwell.
  • Constitutional Right: Article 19(1)(e) allows citizens to reside and settle anywhere, thus enabling a shift in voting constituency.
  1. Migrant Workers – The Practical Dilemma
  • Scale: 15 crore potential voters are migrant workers (intra- and inter-state).
  • Nature of Migration: Often single male migration, seasonal work, temporary shelters, and frequent movement.
  • Political Sensitivity: Host states fear political distortion by migrant voters unfamiliar with local issues.
  • Documentation Hurdles: Many migrants lack valid voter ID proof at new locations; Aadhaar not accepted in SIR for fresh registration.
  1. Legal vs Political Challenges
  • De Jure: Migrants can register in new constituencies under the RP Act.
  • De Facto: Social, political, and logistical hurdles may lead to disenfranchisement.
  • Host State Opposition: Regional parties claim migrants dilute local political identity.
  • Home State Concern: Loss of vote share in the migrant’s native region, affecting representative accountability.
  1. Solutions and Technological Possibilities

Short-Term Measures

  • Enforce statutory holiday on polling day for migrant-heavy sectors.
  • Special train and bus services to enable return to native constituencies.
  • Paid travel leave for inter-state migrants.

Medium-Term Measures

  • Pilot Multi-Constituency Remote EVMs (RVMs) – previously tested by ECI for up to 72 constituencies but paused due to political objections.
  • Digital voter authentication linked with secure blockchain-based polling systems (explored globally).

Long-Term Measures

  • Amend RP Act to explicitly protect migrant voting choice—whether at origin or destination.
  • Establish a National Migrant Voter Facilitation Programme under ECI, in partnership with Labour Ministry and Indian Railways.

Conclusion

The disenfranchisement of migrant workers is both a constitutional concern and a democratic deficit. While legal provisions under the RP Act provide avenues for inclusion, practical and political constraints demand a multi-pronged approach combining legal reform, logistical facilitation, and secure technology adoption. As the Supreme Court deliberates on the SIR-linked cases, it must balance the sanctity of “ordinary residence” with the imperative of preserving universal adult franchise for India’s most mobile and vulnerable workforce.

Previous Year UPSC Mains Questions

  • 2022 (GS 2): “Discuss the role of the Election Commission of India in ensuring free and fair elections in India.”
  • 2017 (GS 2): “Discuss the challenges to free and fair elections in India. Suggest reforms to strengthen the electoral process.”
  • 2015 (GS 2): “The right to vote is a legal right, not a fundamental right. Examine its implications on electoral participation in India.”

Introduction

The recent withdrawal of over 300 Chinese engineers from Foxconn’s iPhone 17 manufacturing facilities in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka is not merely an administrative move but a geo-economic stratagem aimed at stalling India’s manufacturing momentum. Coupled with export restrictions on rare earths, critical minerals, and high-end manufacturing equipment, these actions reflect Beijing’s intent to preserve a “unipolar Asia” under its economic hegemony. For India, these events underscore the vulnerabilities in its industrial base, strategic dependencies, and supply chain resilience in the face of economic coercion by a major competitor.

Body

  1. Nature of China’s Actions
  • Human Capital Withdrawal: Specialised Chinese technicians recalled, disrupting technology transfer and operational efficiency in advanced manufacturing.
  • Resource Leverage: Export restrictions on rare earths (gallium, germanium, graphite) and critical minerals essential for electronics, EVs, and defence.
  • Equipment Access Curtailment: Informal curbs on high-end electronics assembly machinery, boring machines, and solar manufacturing equipment.
  • Covert Trade Restrictions: Non-tariff barriers via verbal instructions, administrative delays, and supply chain disruption.

Implication: Keeps India dependent on Chinese inputs, slowing self-reliance in high-value sectors.

  1. Strategic Context – China’s Domestic Compulsions
  • Demographic Decline: Ageing population due to one-child policy legacy.
  • Economic Pressures: Real estate crisis, overcapacity, and low domestic consumption compel heavy reliance on exports.
  • Trade Surplus Dependence: Nearly $1 trillion surplus, with aggressive price undercutting to retain market share (e.g., BYD in EVs).
  • Political Stability: Export revenues fund domestic security and military budgets; losing competitiveness could trigger social instability.
  1. India’s Vulnerabilities
  • Nascent Manufacturing Base: Persistent infrastructure gaps and bureaucratic hurdles.
  • Import Dependence: Reliance on China and other countries for semiconductors, critical components, and even basic assembly technology.
  • Limited Value-Chain Control: “Make in India” heavily dependent on external supply chains.
  • Strategic Fragility in Alliances: Recent U.S. tariff hikes on Indian goods (50%) despite exemptions for China highlight the unpredictability of friend-shoring partners.
  1. Lessons and Way Forward
  2. a) Industrial Self-Reliance:
  • Accelerate PLI schemes for electronics, semiconductors, and EVs.
  • Invest in domestic rare earth mining and refining capabilities (per Mines and Minerals Amendment, 2023).
  1. b) Strategic Supply Chain Security:
  • Diversify imports of critical minerals from Australia, Africa, and Latin America.
  • Develop indigenous technology for high-end manufacturing equipment.
  1. c) Infrastructure and Policy Reform:
  • Streamline approvals, reduce logistics bottlenecks, and incentivise R&D.
  • Upgrade port connectivity and power reliability for global competitiveness.
  1. d) Strategic Autonomy:
  • Reduce overdependence on Western friend-shoring by building multi-alignment trade partnerships.
  • Engage ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America for markets and resources.

Conclusion

China’s calibrated moves to undermine India’s manufacturing ambitions are part of a broader strategy to preserve its economic primacy and internal stability. The lesson for India is clear — strategic vulnerabilities are best addressed by building a strong, self-reliant industrial ecosystem, reducing dependency on external sources, and pursuing genuine strategic autonomy. Only then can India realistically emerge as a credible competitor in the global manufacturing landscape and resist economic coercion.

Previous Year UPSC Mains Questions

  • 2023 (GS 2): “Economic diplomacy has become the core of India’s foreign policy.” Analyse with examples.
  • 2020 (GS 3): “How far is India prepared to handle supply chain disruptions in critical sectors?” Discuss.
  • 2018 (GS 2): “What are the strategic challenges in India-China economic relations, and how can they be addressed?”

Introduction:

India’s foreign policy is at a critical inflection point, shaped by an evolving global order marked by strategic realignments, protectionism, and regional conflicts. As geopolitical cooperation gives way to confrontation, India’s traditional calibrated neutrality and issue-based alignment faces diminishing returns. The post-Galwan standoff with China, U.S. trade coercion under Trump, EU’s selective sanctions, and the re-emergence of Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood are reshaping India’s external environment. India must therefore evolve from being a reactive power to a proactive geopolitical actor.

Body:

  1. Disruptions to India’s Strategic Partnerships:
  • Despite decisive retaliation in Operation Sindoor, major partners like the U.S. and EU showed reluctance in calling out Pakistan, revealing weak support on India’s core security issues.
  • U.S. imposed 25% tariffs on India even as NISAR satellite collaboration was being celebrated — turning trade disputes into geopolitical pressure over Russian oil imports.
  • U.S. double standards evident in its continued imports of Russian uranium and palladium, even while criticising India’s energy ties with Russia.
  1. China’s Opportunism in the Neighbourhood:
  • China leveraged the power vacuum through:
  • Proposals like China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral grouping,
  • Military base at Lalmonirhat (Bangladesh) near the Siliguri Corridor,
  • Standardising names in Arunachal Pradesh, and
  • Squeezing Indian supply chains using its dominance in rare earths, APIs, tunnel boring equipment.
  • Construction of China’s largest dam near Brahmaputra threatens India’s water security.
  1. Strategic Ambiguity on Global Conflicts:
  • India’s passivity on Gaza, Israel-Iran, and Ukraine contrasts with its expectations for support on regional issues like Kashmir and terrorism.
  • Operation Sindoor demonstrated that global solidarity is reciprocal — India must engage more actively in global conflicts to ensure its concerns are also prioritised.
  1. The Economic Implications of Geopolitical Weakness:
  • The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and sanctions on Vadinar Refinery highlight coercive trade tactics under the guise of climate or ethical concerns.
  • India’s missed RCEP opportunity and delays in concluding the India-EU BTIA and India-U.S. trade deal constrain economic leverage.
  • In today’s world, geopolitics dictates trade and technology flows — not just WTO rules or MFN status.

Way Forward:

  1. Adopt Assertive Multi-Alignment:
    • Deepen engagements with BRICS, SCO, ASEAN, and African Union while safeguarding autonomy.
  2. Pursue Early Trade Agreements:
    • Conclude the India-U.S. trade deal and India-EU BTIA to anchor economic ties in uncertain geopolitics.
  3. Recalibrate Position on Global Conflicts:
    • Take clear, strategic stands on major international issues to gain moral and diplomatic reciprocity.
  4. Strengthen Neighbourhood Diplomacy:
    • Counter China’s influence in Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar through targeted investments and cultural diplomacy.
  5. Leverage Strategic Summits:
    • Use India’s BRICS 2026 presidency and Quad leadership to project India’s global leadership ambitions.

Conclusion:

India can no longer afford to “keep its head down” and expect economic growth in isolation from geopolitical realities. The post-pandemic and post-Galwan world has shattered the old template of silent rise. In a fragmented, transactional and coercive world, India must integrate its foreign policy, trade, and technology strategies to secure its long-term national interests. To get its economic and technological trajectory right, India must first get its geopolitics right.

Relevant UPSC Previous Year Questions (PYQs):

  • GS II (2023): “In view of India’s growing economic and strategic clout, should it reconsider its position on non-alignment?”
  • GS II (2020): “What are the key challenges in India’s neighbourhood policy? Suggest a revised strategy.”
  • GS II (2018): “India’s foreign policy has shifted from idealism to realism in recent years.” Discuss with examples.
  • GS II (2015): “Critically examine the evolving role of India in a multipolar world.”

Sources:

  • Ministry of External Affairs, India (2025)
  • UN Security Council Reports (2025)
  • Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (2025)
  • Trade data from Ministry of Commerce and Industry
  • Statements from Parliamentary Debates and Foreign Policy Think Tanks

Introduction:

India’s welfare model is undergoing a transformative shift. With over 1.2 billion Aadhaar enrollments, 1200+ Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) schemes, and 36 state grievance redressal portals, the State is embracing a technocratic and data-driven model of welfare delivery. While this enhances efficiency and reduces leakages, it also raises concerns about political accountability, federalism, and participatory democracy. Scholars refer to this shift as the emergence of a post-rights based welfare regime, where citizens risk becoming auditable data points rather than rights-bearing individuals.

Body:

  1. Efficiency at the Cost of Democratic Norms:
  • Welfare schemes like PM-KISAN, e-SHRAM, and Aadhaar-linked PDS prioritize algorithmic coverage and auditability, while ignoring local contexts and discretion.
  • This marks a shift in governance from deliberating “who deserves and why” to “how to reduce leakage and track transactions.”
  • Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s dissenting opinion in the Aadhaar verdict (2018) warned against the dehumanisation of citizens into “disembedded data points”.
  1. Shrinking Social Sector Spending and Participation:
  • India’s social sector spending declined to 17% of total expenditure in 2024–25, down from the 21% average between 2014–2024 (Budget Documents).
  • Key welfare heads like minority welfare, employment, nutrition, and social security fell from 11% (pre-COVID) to just 3% (post-COVID).
  • RTI pendency (4 lakh+ cases as of June 2024, CIC Report) and vacant information commissioner posts (8 vacancies) reveal weakening transparency architecture.
  1. The Federal and Democratic Deficit:
  • Systems like CPGRAMS centralise grievance redressal but flatten state-level accountability, creating “algorithmic insulation” that shields political actors from responsibility.
  • States are becoming passive implementers of centrally-designed schemes, undermining grassroots deliberation and Gram Sabha discretion.
  1. Philosophical and Political Concerns:
  • Drawing on Habermas’ technocratic consciousness and Foucault’s governmentality, the current welfare regime strips away contextual and reflexive decision-making.
  • Citizens become “homo sacer” (Agamben) — politically invisible, even when administratively registered.
  • Rancière’s warning that democracy hinges on whose suffering is made visible and contestable, not just computable, becomes especially relevant.

Way Forward:

  1. Democratic Anti-fragility:
  • Build systems that are resilient to stress, not dependent on perfect data.
  • Include offline fallback mechanisms, human-in-the-loop decision making, and statutory “right to explanation and appeal” in digital governance (UNHRC Guidelines).
  1. Federal Pluralism:
  • Empower States to design and adapt welfare schemes to local contexts.
  • Institutionalise Gram Panchayat Development Plans and promote Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan for participatory planning.
  1. Community-Driven Impact Audits:
  • Encourage platform cooperatives (e.g., Kerala’s Kudumbashree) and civil society-led audits for real-time feedback.
  • Strengthen legal aid clinics, grassroots political education, and community forums.
  1. Reinvigorate Transparency Institutions:
  • Fill RTI vacancies, reform Information Commissions, and integrate grievance dashboards with accountability metrics.

Conclusion:

A technocratic welfare state may be fast and efficient, but without democratic deliberation, it risks alienating those it aims to serve. A “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India) must not be built on mere digital coverage, but on constitutional compassion, political inclusion, and participatory governance. Welfare delivery must reorient from algorithmic auditability to citizen dignity, ensuring people remain partners, not datapoints, in governance.

Relevant UPSC PYQs:

  • GS II (2023): Digital governance is an enabler but not a substitute for democratic participation. Discuss.
  • GS II (2022): Do you agree that the Indian state has moved from a welfare model to a technocratic model of governance? Justify.
  • GS II (2020): Examine the challenges posed by the use of technology in governance without strong democratic safeguards.
  • GS II (2019): E-governance is not just about technology but about transforming service delivery. Elaborate.

Sources:

  • Union Budget 2024–25 Expenditure Data
  • Central Information Commission (CIC) Annual Report 2023–24
  • Ministry of Electronics & IT – CPGRAMS Dashboard
  • Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s Aadhaar Dissent (2018)
  • UNHRC Report on Digital Welfare Systems (2022)

Introduction:

A year after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024, Bangladesh finds itself embroiled in political instability, religious extremism, economic distress, and growing anti-India sentiment. The regime under Prof. Muhammad Yunus, initially projected as a result of a spontaneous student movement, is now widely seen as a strategic power shift orchestrated by radical forces led by Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI). The regime’s authoritarian tendencies, repression of minorities, and failure to deliver economic stability have further alienated the population and worsened bilateral ties with India.

Body:

  1. Legitimacy Crisis and Rise of Islamist Politics:
  • The Yunus-led regime lacks constitutional legitimacy, as the Bangladesh Constitution has no provision for an interim government of this kind.
  • While court orders reinstated a caretaker system, the inclusion of Islamist groups like Hizb-ut Tahrir and Hefazat-e-Islam as advisors has violated neutrality, turning governance into an instrument of religious radicalisation.
  • Tweets from advisors calling for a Sharia-based caliphate and civil war highlight the Islamist agenda’s grip on governance.
  1. Suppression of Opposition and Liberation War Legacy:
  • Awami League activities were banned; its members have been imprisoned or killed.
  • Monuments and institutions linked to the 1971 Liberation War were destroyed, eroding Bangladesh’s secular nationalist identity.
  • The creation of the National Citizen Party (NCP), alleged to be the ‘King’s Party’, has failed to gain popular traction and is widely perceived as a front for JeI interests.
  1. Mobocracy and Institutional Erosion:
  • Key state organs — judiciary, central bank, and media — have been undermined through mob pressure and violent coercion.
  • Journalists have been imprisoned, silenced, or impoverished, enabling the regime to control narratives and restrict dissent.
  1. Economic Decline and Public Discontent:
  • GDP growth halved, inflation soared, factories closed, and private investment stagnated.
  • The Bangladesh Bank’s 2025 report cited “persistent inflation and election uncertainty” as major challenges.
  • The public’s growing frustration has led to a collective yearning for the stability and prosperity of Hasina’s rule.
  1. Strained Ties with India Amid China-Pakistan Pivot:
  • The Yunus regime’s anti-India propaganda and foreign policy tilt toward Pakistan and China have strained bilateral ties.
  • Despite provocations, India has shown strategic patience, reaffirming its support for a democratic, peaceful, and inclusive Bangladesh.
  • India’s people-centric approach and emphasis on restoring free and fair elections reflect a desire to rebuild ties with a legitimate, elected government.

Conclusion:

Bangladesh, under the interim Yunus regime, has veered off its constitutional, secular, and democratic course, descending into mob-led governance, economic chaos, and radicalised policymaking. The erosion of institutional credibility, violence against minorities, and manipulation of electoral timelines have alienated the people. Public sentiment now increasingly echoes a longing for stability, prosperity, and secular governance. India remains committed to supporting a people-elected government that honours democratic values and bilateral cooperation. The road ahead lies in early, inclusive, and credible elections, restoring both domestic legitimacy and regional stability.

Relevant UPSC Previous Year Questions (PYQs):

  • GS Paper II (2023): “Critically analyse India’s foreign policy approach toward its neighbours amidst regional instability.”
  • GS Paper II (2021): “India’s neighbourhood policy needs a pragmatic shift in the face of growing Chinese influence.” Discuss.
  • GS Paper II (2018): “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and their impact on India’s interests.”
  • GS Paper II (2015): “Discuss the role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security in India.”

Sources Used:

  • Bangladesh Bank Report (July 2025)
  • UNFCCC Reports
  • Bangladesh Supreme Court Orders (Dec 2024)
  • MEA statements from PM Modi-Yunus bilateral meeting (April 2025)
  • Veena Sikri Editorial (The Hindu, August 2025)

Introduction:

India’s ambitious electrification and decarbonisation goals, driven by electric vehicles (EVs) and renewable energy storage, are catalysing an exponential surge in lithium battery usage. With projections of lithium battery demand rising from 4 GWh in 2023 to 139 GWh by 2035, the associated battery waste challenge is equally pressing. In 2022 alone, lithium batteries contributed to 7,00,000 metric tonnes of India’s 1.6 million tonnes of e-waste. Recognising this, the Battery Waste Management Rules (BWMR), 2022 were introduced with Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) as a cornerstone policy. However, key gaps remain in implementation, especially regarding the EPR floor price, posing both environmental and economic risks.

Body:

  1. EPR and the Challenge of Low Floor Pricing:
  • EPR mandates producers to finance battery collection and recycling through certified recyclers.
  • Recyclers depend on EPR certificates to recover costs, but the floor price under consideration is too low, discouraging investment in safe and efficient recycling.
  • For context, EV battery recycling in the U.K. earns recyclers ₹600/kg, compared to less than ₹150/kg being discussed in India, even after adjusting for purchasing power.
  1. Implications of a Weak EPR Pricing Framework:
  • Unsustainable business models drive recyclers to cut corners or operate informally, issuing fake certificates or dumping hazardous waste.
  • Such malpractices mirror failures seen in India’s plastic waste sector, distorting the market and undermining formal recyclers.
  • Rare mineral recovery (e.g., cobalt, lithium, nickel) becomes inefficient, increasing import dependency and resulting in foreign exchange losses — estimated to exceed $1 billion by 2030.
  1. Producer Non-Compliance and Global Inequality:
  • Large OEMs and electronics manufacturers often apply double standards, complying in developed markets while resisting regulations in developing nations like India.
  • Despite global metal price reductions, cost savings haven’t been passed to consumers, showing that higher EPR pricing won’t raise retail prices significantly.
  1. Recommendations: Policy and Market Integration:
  • India must adopt a globally comparable EPR floor price, reflecting true recycling costs, to encourage sustainable investments.
  • Introduce robust audit mechanisms, digital tracking of EPR certificates, and penalties for fraud to improve enforcement.
  • Integrate informal recyclers by providing training and compliance support, expanding recycling capacity while eliminating unsafe practices.
  • A market-based flexible pricing system, adjusting over time as the sector matures, can allow transition towards a self-sustaining circular economy.

Conclusion:

India stands at a pivotal juncture where battery waste management is no longer a peripheral concern but a strategic imperative for energy security, environmental health, and economic resilience. Fixing the EPR floor price mechanism, strengthening enforcement, and mainstreaming informal recyclers are critical first steps. With the right policy recalibrations and stakeholder collaboration, battery waste can be transformed from a crisis to an opportunity — powering India’s journey toward a clean, circular, and sustainable economy.

Relevant UPSC Previous Year Questions (PYQs):

  • GS III (2021): “What are the challenges and opportunities of waste-to-energy projects in India?”
  • GS III (2020): “India’s e-waste management system requires structural reforms. Discuss.”
  • GS III (2019): “How far do you agree that the behaviour of consumers and manufacturers has caused the e-waste problem in India? What can be done to manage e-waste effectively?”
  • GS III (2016): “Recycling of e-waste in India is a major concern. Discuss the steps taken and challenges remaining.”

Sources:

  • Battery Waste Management Rules, MoEFCC (2022)
  • NITI Aayog Report on Battery Storage and Circular Economy (2023)
  • Central Pollution Control Board Data (2022)
  • United Nations E-Waste Monitoring Report (2023)
  • UK Government Battery Waste Pricing Guidelines

 

Introduction:

India’s recent conclusion of the India-United Kingdom Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has attracted scrutiny, particularly for its provisions on intellectual property rights (IPR) and public health safeguards. Article 13.6 of the agreement promotes voluntary licensing as the “preferable” route for ensuring access to medicines. This development marks a significant shift in India’s long-standing position at global forums, where it had strongly advocated for compulsory licensing as a key measure to ensure affordable access to life-saving drugs in developing nations.

Body:

  1. Compulsory Licensing: India’s Historical Position
  • India’s Patents Act (Amended in 2005), in compliance with WTO’s TRIPS Agreement, incorporated compulsory licensing to counter high medicine prices and unmet public health needs.
  • Notably, in 2012, the Natco Pharma vs. Bayer case enabled the production of sorafenib tosylate (anti-cancer drug), reducing its cost from ₹2.8 lakh to under ₹9,000 per month.
  • India had historically championed the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001), which reaffirmed developing countries’ rights to issue compulsory licences.
  1. Shift to Voluntary Licensing under CETA
  • Article 13.6 of CETA prefers voluntary licensing, thereby undermining India’s ability to issue compulsory licences on its own terms.
  • The inclusion of such provisions dilutes India’s autonomy in determining public health safeguards and contradicts its earlier WTO stance.
  • This move also reflects a pattern of concessions, as seen in India’s FTA with the European Free Trade Association, where reporting requirements on patent working were weakened.
  1. Implications for Access to Medicines
  • Voluntary licences, controlled by pharmaceutical giants, often come with restrictive conditions — such as limited geographies, technology control, and API supply regulation — weakening the bargaining power of generic manufacturers.
  • Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has documented such constraints, notably in the case of Cipla’s remdesivir production during COVID-19, where Indian prices were higher than U.S. prices in PPP terms.
  1. Impact on Technology Transfer Demands
  • The pact also affects India’s demand for technology transfer on favourable terms, long advocated since the New International Economic Order (NIEO, 1974).
  • India’s Fourth Biennial Update Report (2024) to the UNFCCC cited slow technology transfer and IP barriers as major hurdles in adopting climate-friendly technologies.
  • By accepting language promoting voluntary mechanisms, India risks weakening its voice in future climate negotiations demanding IPR-flexible green technology transfers.

Conclusion:

The CETA’s intellectual property chapter, while appearing cooperative, represents a significant policy reversal on India’s part. By prioritizing voluntary licensing over compulsory licensing, India may lose leverage in global health and climate forums. In the pursuit of deeper trade ties with the UK, India must be cautious not to compromise long-held positions that uphold the right to affordable medicines and technology sovereignty for the Global South. Safeguards and policy space in trade negotiations are vital to balance public health priorities with international trade commitments.

Relevant Previous Year UPSC Mains Questions:

  • GS II (2022): “Discuss the role of IPR in the context of global public health, especially with reference to the COVID-19 pandemic.”
  • GS III (2015): “Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are critical in fostering innovation. In light of the statement, examine India’s IPR policy.”
  • GS II (2013): “Discuss the impact of FTAs on public health in developing countries with reference to TRIPS provisions and India’s pharmaceutical industry.”

Sources:

  • Ministry of Commerce and Industry – India-UK CETA draft
  • WTO TRIPS Agreement
  • Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001)
  • India’s Fourth Biennial Update Report to UNFCCC (2024)
  • Médecins Sans Frontières Reports
  • Case Law: Natco vs. Bayer (2012)

 

Introduction: Mangroves—Nature’s Blue Capital

Mangroves, the salt-tolerant trees found in tropical and subtropical coastal zones, are blue carbon ecosystems that offer immense ecological, economic, and climate benefits. Yet, they remain marginal in policy discourse, often viewed narrowly as biodiversity buffers rather than critical natural infrastructure. As climate change intensifies coastal risks, mangroves offer a sustainable, low-cost solution to urban resilience, livelihoods, and carbon sequestration.

Body

  1. Ecological and Economic Value of Mangroves
  • Climate Resilience and Carbon Sequestration:
  • Mangroves sequester up to 4x more carbon per hectare than terrestrial forests.
  • In the Sundarbans, carbon sequestration alone is valued at ₹462 million/year, while total services are worth ₹664 billion.
  • Disaster Risk Reduction:
  • Mangroves reduce storm surge and coastal erosion, saving billions in avoided infrastructure damages.
  • Livelihood Security:
  • They act as nurseries for fish, sustaining fisheries and ensuring food and income security for coastal communities.
  • Livelihood alternatives like aquaculture, eco-tourism, and apiculture also emerge from healthy mangrove systems.
  1. Challenges in Urban and Coastal Contexts
  • Degradation in cities like Mumbai and Chennai due to encroachment, pollution, and neglect.
  • Lack of community empowerment, undervaluation in fiscal planning, and weak enforcement contribute to mangrove loss.
  • Mangroves are missing from national balance sheets, despite their role in ecosystem services and disaster mitigation.
  1. Three-Pillar Strategy for Sustainable Mangrove Stewardship
  2. Technology & Natural Capital Accounting
  • Use of satellite, drone, and AI-enabled geospatial tools to map mangrove extent and quantify ecosystem services.
  • Natural capital valuation (e.g., ₹3,535 million in Pichavaram) helps inform policy and investment decisions.
  1. Community-Centric Conservation
  • Fisherfolk and local communities possess deep ecological knowledge.
  • Empowered through Joint Forest Management Committees (JFMCs) or Eco-Development Committees (EDCs), they become long-term custodians.
  • Locally anchored stewardship ensures resilient socio-ecological systems.
  1. Citizen Science and Public Engagement
  • Initiatives like “Mangrove Mitras” (Friends of Mangroves) promote awareness and monitoring.
  • Indicators like freshwater flow, biodiversity, and community dependence should guide adaptive management.
  • Community-driven monitoring enhances accountability and trust.

Conclusion: Mangroves as a Climate-Economic Imperative

Mangroves are not just biodiversity reserves but vital infrastructure for climate adaptation, economic resilience, and inclusive development. India must mainstream mangrove health into urban planning, national accounting, and climate financing. Sustainable stewardship must be built on a coalition of science, business, and community voices, reimagining mangroves as living assets for the future.

Way Forward

  • Incorporate mangrove value in GDP and climate policy.
  • Adopt blue carbon credits as part of India’s net-zero strategy.
  • Enforce CRZ (Coastal Regulation Zone) norms with participatory governance.
  • Establish urban mangrove missions in coastal Smart Cities.

Linkages with UPSC Syllabus

  • GS Paper III:
    • Conservation, environmental pollution and degradation
    • Disaster management (coastal storms, sea-level rise)
    • Biodiversity and its preservation
    • Role of technology in environmental conservation

Previous Year UPSC Questions Linkage

  • GS III (2023): “How do mangroves function as a carbon sink and why is their conservation vital in the context of climate change?”
  • GS III (2021): “Explain the causes and effects of coastal erosion in India. What are the available coastal management strategies?”
  • GS III (2020): “What are the key features of the National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC)?”
  • GS III (2018): “How does biodiversity vary in India? How is the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 helping in the conservation of flora and fauna?”

Sources:

  • The Hindu Editorial (Authors: Madhav Pai, Soumya Swaminathan, Sejal Worah)
  • Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC)
  • WRI India & WWF India reports
  • Blue Carbon Initiative
  • India State of Forest Report (ISFR) 2023

Introduction: Digital Sovereignty as Strategic Autonomy

Digital sovereignty refers to a nation’s control over its digital infrastructure, data, regulations, and technological development. It has emerged as a vital pillar of national security and economic strategy. However, India’s recent Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the United Kingdom appears to have made several concessions in the digital domain that undermine this autonomy, raising concerns over long-term strategic interests.

Body

  1. Key Concessions in the India-U.K. FTA
  • Source Code Disclosure Concession:
    • India surrendered its right to demand ex ante source code access for foreign digital services.
    • This is a reversal of India’s long-held stance at the WTO and other forums.
    • Even the U.S. has backtracked on earlier free-trade source code non-disclosure rules to protect critical sectors.
  • Open Government Data Access:
    • India agreed to provide equal and non-discriminatory access to Open Government Data to U.K. entities.
    • While currently non-binding (“best endeavour”), this move dilutes data as a sovereign economic resource — critical in AI development and strategic analytics.
  • Ambiguity on Data Localization and Free Flow of Data:
    • India has signalled willingness to extend equivalent digital trade terms to the U.K. if offered to another nation, showing vulnerability in future negotiations.
    • These commitments may create binding precedents for future FTAs with the EU or U.S.
  1. Strategic Implications
  • Security and Regulatory Challenges:
    • Lack of source code access can impair national cybersecurity audits in AI, telecom, and healthcare sectors.
    • Foreign control over sensitive software could delay real-time safety upgrades.
  • Loss of Digital Competitiveness:
    • Government-held data is key to AI innovation. Sharing this data undermines India’s AI self-reliance and startup ecosystem.
    • Weak digital safeguards may reduce India’s leverage in global digital norm-setting.
  • Lack of Policy Cohesion:
    • India lacks a comprehensive Digital Sovereignty and Digital Industrialisation Policy.
    • Negotiations have been conducted reactively, without inputs from digital sovereignty experts or alignment with national digital goals.

Conclusion: A Strategic Reorientation Needed

In the race to conclude high-profile FTAs, India must not compromise on irreversible digital concessions. Digital trade agreements shape global rule-making, not just market access. Given its late entry into digital industrialization, India must carve out regulatory autonomy, protect digital public goods, and build a resilient domestic ecosystem. The need of the hour is a national digital sovereignty strategy, anchored in strategic foresight and guided by high-level political leadership.

Way Forward

  • Formulate a National Digital Sovereignty Framework to guide FTA negotiations.
  • Mandate participation of tech-policy experts in trade talks to safeguard long-term interests.
  • Develop India-specific digital architectures and standards, especially in AI, cybersecurity, and data governance.
  • Pursue strategic data localization with flexibility for trusted partners, in line with India’s national interest.
  • Institutionalize regular parliamentary and public scrutiny of digital trade chapters in FTAs.

Linkages with UPSC Syllabus

  • GS Paper II:
    • Bilateral agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests
    • Effects of policies and politics of developed countries on India’s interests
  • GS Paper III:
    • Awareness in fields of IT and Computers
    • Role of digital infrastructure in development
    • Security challenges in cyberspace

Previous Year UPSC Questions Linkage

  • GS II (2021): “India’s relations with its neighbours have deteriorated. Examine with reference to Bangladesh and Nepal.” (Relates to bilateral diplomacy and trade-offs.)
  • GS III (2020): “Discuss different types of cybercrimes and measures to be taken to fight them.”
  • GS II (2018): “Bilateral trade agreements in the present global scenario have led to a shift in the focus of India’s foreign policy.”
  • GS III (2023 Expected Trend): Role of digital sovereignty in national security and trade

Sources:

  • Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India
  • India-UK Joint Statement (2024)
  • WTO Digital Trade Discussions
  • The Hindu Editorial by Smita Purushottam (2024)
  • U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 2023 Digital Trade Policy Shift

Introduction

The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 has initiated a paradigm shift in Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) by integrating it within the formal education framework. Historically restricted to Anganwadi centres in the public sector, ECCE now sees an ambitious transformation as government schools begin preschool classes (Balvatika 1, 2, 3). This structural reform aims to enhance equity, access, and quality in early childhood development, addressing long-standing disparities in India’s educational landscape.

Body

  1. Expansion of ECCE Infrastructure in Government Schools
  • NEP 2020 targets universalisation of ECCE by 2030, expanding beyond the static network of ~14 lakh Anganwadi centres.
  • The addition of three preschool levels in government primary schools marks a massive public sector expansion.
  • The Samagra Shiksha scheme now finances preschool education; several States/UTs have started implementation, though utilisation levels vary.
  • Implications: Strategic planning in recruitment, training, and deployment of qualified ECCE professionals is necessary to ensure quality outcomes.
  1. Migration from Anganwadis to Government Preschools
  • Increasing parental preference for education-oriented preschool classes over traditional Anganwadi models is evident.
  • Case study: In Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu, all primary schools now offer preschool classes; 4–6-year-olds are shifting away from Anganwadis.
  • Challenge: Anganwadis risk becoming obsolete unless they incorporate educational components meaningfully.
  • Initiative: ‘Poshan bhi Padhai bhi’ launched by the Ministry of Women and Child Development aims to balance nutrition and early learning.
  • Caution: Government schools must avoid “schoolification” of play-based learning—preserving play as the core mode of preschool pedagogy is essential.
  1. Reorientation Towards 0–3 Year Age Group and Home Visits
  • Studies like the ‘Perry Preschool at 50’ (USA) and Yale-Pratham research (Odisha) stress the importance of home visits for 0–3-year-olds.
  • Current Anganwadi focus leans toward 3–6 age group due to daily centre attendance, leaving infants and mothers underserved.
  • Vision: If schools manage 3–6-year-olds, Anganwadi workers can reallocate attention to 0–3-year-olds and maternal care through targeted home visits.
  • Supported by policy voices including V.K. Paul (NITI Aayog) and N.C. Saxena (ex-IAS), this approach aligns with the POSHAN Abhiyaan’s emphasis on the first 1,000 days.

Conclusion

The NEP 2020 marks a transformational juncture in ECCE, integrating preschools into formal education while offering a renewed role for Anganwadis in catering to infant and maternal care. Realising this vision requires inter-ministerial coordination, adequate financial provisioning, and monitoring of state-level implementation. If executed effectively, India’s ECCE system could evolve into a robust, inclusive, and developmentally appropriate model—laying the foundation for lifelong learning and equitable human capital formation.

Linked UPSC Syllabus

GS Paper II – Governance, Constitution, Polity, Social Justice and International Relations

  • Issues relating to development and management of social sector/services relating to education and human resources
  • Welfare schemes for vulnerable sections, particularly children

Previous Year Questions (PYQs) Linked

  • UPSC 2020 (GS Paper II): “National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goal-4 (SDG-4) of education. Critically examine the statement.”
  • UPSC 2019 (GS Paper II): “Despite the Structural reforms initiated, the quality of primary education in India is still a cause of concern. Examine.”
  • UPSC 2018 (GS Paper II): “Strengthening the health and education sectors is essential for inclusive growth. Discuss.”

Sources:

  • NEP 2020, Ministry of Education
  • Samagra Shiksha Portal
  • Ministry of Women and Child Development – Poshan Bhi Padhai Bhi (2023)
  • Pratham & Yale Study on ECCE (2021)
  • Economic Survey 2023–24
  • Government of India’s POSHAN Abhiyaan Reports

Introduction: The Spectacle of Virality and the Erosion of Privacy

In today’s hyper-connected world, the boundaries between public and private are increasingly blurred. The Coldplay concert ‘kiss-cam’ incident in Boston — where a video capturing two individuals presumed to be involved in an affair went viral, resulting in reputational damage and resignation — serves as a case study of the complex interplay between privacy, digital surveillance, and moral spectacle. It compels us to revisit foundational questions around consent, context, ethics, and accountability in the digital public sphere.

Body

  1. Participatory Surveillance and Spectator Morality
  • Media theorist Mark Andrejevic coined the term “lateral surveillance” — where ordinary people monitor each other using digital tools.
  • This Coldplay incident was not isolated; similar viral content in India’s Delhi Metro (2023) led to trolling and moral policing, disproportionately targeting women and marginalized individuals.
  • Digital virality often thrives on emotionally provocative content, not truth — as explained by Shoshana Zuboff’s “Surveillance Capitalism” model.
  1. Contextual Integrity and the Ethics of Sharing
  • Philosopher Helen Nissenbaum asserts privacy is not secrecy, but control over personal information within specific contexts.
  • A concertgoer does not expect a momentary expression to become global spectacle, yet algorithm-driven platforms transform these private gestures into memeable content.
  • Daniel Trottier’s “Digital Vigilantism” further captures the danger of informal, crowd-sourced justice — where judgment precedes facts and ruins lives.
  1. Platform Architecture and Algorithmic Amplification
  • Platforms like TikTok, Instagram, X prioritise engagement over ethics, using algorithms that push emotionally charged content.
  • As Nancy Baym notes, platforms shape not just our consumption but our behavior — nudging users towards performance rather than reflection.
  • This problem is worsened in India, where digital literacy gaps coexist with caste, gender, and religious hierarchies, making vulnerable communities easy targets of online harassment.
  1. The Failure of Legacy Media
  • Media houses increasingly echo viral social media narratives without adequate verification, as seen in the CEO resignation case.
  • This inversion of journalistic ethics, where virality precedes truth, raises questions about the media’s gatekeeping role in the digital age.

Conclusion: Building an Ethical Digital Culture

The Coldplay episode underscores the need for a deeper reflection on digital citizenship. Legal frameworks like defamation and privacy laws exist but are inadequate against algorithmically distributed harm. The solution lies in:

  • Enhancing public digital ethics awareness, especially among youth.
  • Platforms deploying AI-based tools to flag and moderate sensitive or potentially harmful content.
  • Journalism reaffirming its ethical core — where verification, proportionality, and context precede publication.
  • Users cultivating empathy, acknowledging that every share or comment could carry irreversible consequences.

Ultimately, in a world where every fleeting moment risks becoming viral spectacle, building a digital ecosystem anchored in empathy, restraint, and responsibility is not a luxury, but a necessity.

Previous Year Questions (PYQs) Linkage

  • GS Paper II (2023): “Discuss the ethical concerns surrounding the use of surveillance and data collection in modern governance.”
  • GS Paper IV (2019): “What do you understand by the term ‘digital ethics’? How can they be instilled in society?”
  • GS Paper II (2017): “Discuss the challenges to media ethics in the age of digital technology.”
  • GS Paper IV (2021): “Online anonymity has both protective and harmful implications. Discuss the ethical dimensions involved.”

Introduction

The Indian formal manufacturing sector has witnessed a sharp increase in contractualisation of labour, with the share of contract workers rising from 20% in 1999–2000 to 40.7% in 2022–23 (Annual Survey of Industries). While contract employment offers operational flexibility, excessive reliance on it—especially via third-party contractors—has been shown to adversely impact labour productivity, worker welfare, and industrial growth. This trend raises concerns over the long-term sustainability of India’s growth model, especially as it aspires to become a global manufacturing hub.

Body

  1. Exploitative Nature of Contractual Employment
  • Contract workers are typically excluded from core labour laws under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, weakening their protections against layoffs or arbitrary dismissals.
  • In 2018–19, contract workers earned 14.47% less than regular workers, with the gap reaching 31% in large firms.
  • Labour cost differences widen in several industries, with contract labour costs being 78–85% lower, indicating systemic exploitation.
  1. Negative Impact on Productivity
  • Contract Labour-Intensive (CLI) enterprises had 31% lower labour productivity than Regular Labour-Intensive (RLI) firms.
  • Productivity gaps were starkest in small enterprises (<100 workers) (36%) and labour-intensive firms (42%).
  • High labour turnover and lack of investment in training due to short-term employment further discourage innovation and skill accumulation.
  1. Exceptions and Sectoral Variation
  • Some high-skill CLI enterprises recorded 5–20% productivity gains, especially in large, capital-intensive sectors.
  • However, such enterprises account for only 20% of formal manufacturing, leaving 80% vulnerable to the negative effects of informalisation.
  1. Policy Efforts and Gaps
  • The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 allows direct fixed-term hiring, aiming to curb third-party exploitation while increasing flexibility.
  • Yet, implementation remains pending, and labour unions fear this may accelerate informalisation.
  • The PM Rojgar Protsahan Yojana (PMRPY) incentivised formal job creation by subsidising EPF/EPS contributions, but was discontinued in March 2022, despite benefiting over 1 crore workers.

Conclusion

India’s manufacturing sector needs a balance between flexibility and formality. While contract labour can offer agility in operations, cost-cutting practices that compromise productivity and worker welfare are unsustainable. Policies must promote formalisation, skill development, and statutory protection, especially for vulnerable workers. Reviving and updating schemes like PMRPY, along with expediting labour code implementation, can pave the way toward a high-productivity, equitable industrial ecosystem.

Relevant Previous Year UPSC Mains Questions

  • GS Paper III (2023): Informalisation of work has increased in the post-liberalisation era in India. Examine its impact on productivity and worker welfare.
  • GS Paper III (2020): Examine the challenges and prospects of labour reforms in the context of promoting ease of doing business and ensuring job security.
  • GS Paper III (2015): Has recent labour law reform ensured employment security, wage security, and social security? Critically analyse.
The Changing Nature of Warfare in the Age of Technology

Introduction:

The 21st-century battlefield has evolved beyond conventional kinetic warfare into a multidomain theatre marked by cyber operations, AI-driven systems, drone warfare, and hypersonic weapons. This transformation is driven by geopolitical upheavals post-9/11, the Russia-Ukraine war, West Asia conflicts, and India’s own skirmishes, such as the India-Pakistan conflict of May 2025. As M.K. Narayanan, former NSA, asserts, we are now in an era where dominance is shaped more by digital and autonomous capabilities than physical force.

Body:

  1. Decline of Traditional Warfare Paradigms
  • The Peace of Westphalia (1648) and post-WWII global order are weakening.
  • Post-Cold War era failed to ensure global peace, with new types of asymmetric warfare emerging (e.g., terrorism, proxy wars).
  • The illusion of peace post-1945 was exposed through regional conflicts—Vietnam, Korea, North Africa, and the Balkans.
  1. New Epoch of Conflict: From Desert Storm to 9/11
  • Operation Desert Storm (1991)  marked the beginning of three-dimensional precision warfare, setting the stage for high-tech conflicts.
  • 9/11 attacks (2001) opened space for the West to engage in preemptive interventions (Afghanistan, Iraq) under the rhetoric of self-defense.
  • These events signaled a shift from rules-based warfare to perception-based justifications.
  1. Contemporary Global Conflicts and Military Innovations
  • Russia-Ukraine war (2022 onwards) reflects the changing tactics: widespread use of drones, loitering munitions, cyber offensives, and AI-led targeting.
  • West Asia conflicts display the dominance of non-state actors employing sophisticated drone and cyber tools.
  1. India’s Wake-Up Call: May 2025 India-Pakistan Conflict
  • Featured the use of:
    • Fixed-wing drones, loitering munitions
    • GPS-guided and laser-guided bombs
    • Advanced air-to-air missiles (PL-15 by Pakistan, BrahMos by India)
  • Indicates India’s growing reliance on high-tech warfare but also exposes limitations in indigenous capabilities and tactical doctrines.
  1. Strategic Shift towards Network-Centric and AI Warfare
  • Modern warfare requires:
    • AI-enabled decision-making
    • Cyber capabilities
    • Hypersonic missile systems
    • Multi-domain operations
  • Traditional hierarchical command structures are giving way to agile, decentralized, network-centric systems.

Conclusion:

As global conflict dynamics transform, India must revamp its military doctrines, accelerate indigenous defence production, and adopt AI, cyber, and drone capabilities. Countries like China are already deploying sixth-generation fighter technologies, while India lags behind with delayed indigenous systems and overdependence on foreign platforms. Future wars will not be won through brute force but through autonomous systems, precision targeting, and strategic digital superiority.

Way Forward:

  • Rethink military modernization plans aligned with new warfare domains.
  • Enhance R&D in AI, cyber warfare, and drone technology.
  • Accelerate indigenous manufacturing of UAVs, missiles, and hypersonic systems.
  • Establish multi-domain command structures for synchronized warfare across air, land, sea, cyber, and space.
  • Promote civil-military synergy and public-private partnerships in defence innova

Syllabus Linkage – GS Paper II & III:

  • GS II: Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests.
  • GS III: Security challenges and their management in border areas; Linkages of organized crime with terrorism; Role of technology in internal security.

Relevant Previous Year Questions (PYQs):

  • GS III (2023): How is India addressing the challenges in developing indigenous defence technology?
  • GS III (2021): Analyse the multidimensional challenges posed by external state and non-state actors to internal security.
  • GS III (2019): Cross-border terrorism is a persistent security threat in India. Discuss the measures taken by the government to counter this.

Sources:

  • Editorial by M.K. Narayanan (The Hindu, July 2024)
  • Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2023-24
  • DRDO, PIB Defence Releases
  • Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Reports
  • India’s Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020

Introduction: Buddhism as a Geopolitical Frontier

In the evolving landscape of India-China rivalry, a subtle yet potent dimension of geopolitical contestation has emerged in the Himalayas, not over oil or territory, but over Buddhism and spiritual legitimacy. As Nirupama Rao points out, the region’s Buddhist traditions—rooted in peace and meditation—are now entwined with statecraft and strategic influence. The looming succession of the Dalai Lama has amplified this battle for influence across India’s Himalayan borderlands and beyond.

Body: Faith as a Tool of Strategy and Sovereignty

  1. China’s Buddhist Statecraft:
    • Since the 1950s, China has co-opted Tibetan Buddhism, marginalizing independent lamas and institutionalizing control over reincarnations.
    • The 2007 decree asserting that all “Living Buddhas” require state approval reflects Beijing’s attempt to legitimize spiritual authority through political power.
    • China now maintains a lamas database, funds Buddhist infrastructure across the Himalayas (Nepal, Bhutan), and hosts religious conferences to cultivate loyalty among Himalayan monks.
    • It plans to appoint a state-approved Dalai Lama using the Qing-era “Golden Urn” tradition, likely setting the stage for two rival Dalai Lamas.
  2. India’s Fragmented Buddhist Diplomacy:
    • India has historically hosted the Tibetan exile government and the 14th Dalai Lama since 1959, earning moral credibility but lacking strategic coherence.
    • Recent efforts include promoting pilgrimage circuits and asserting its identity as the Buddha’s land of origin. However, India’s approach remains reactive and decentralised compared to China’s.
    • The looming spiritual succession provides India both a strategic opportunity and a diplomatic challenge.
  • Regional Ramifications:
    • A schism in Tibetan leadership may lead Himalayan populations—in Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan—to choose spiritual allegiance, which could reshape political alignments.
    • China claims Tawang citing its Tibetan heritage, asserting that its cultural linkage justifies territorial claims.
    • In Nepal, Chinese investments in Lumbini aim to root Chinese-friendly narratives around the Buddha’s legacy.
  1. Internal Buddhist Divisions as Strategic Avenues:
    • China and India have aligned themselves with different Karmapas of the Karma Kagyu sect.
    • China supports groups such as the Dorje Shugden sect, marginalized by the Dalai Lama, to undermine the exile authority.
  2. The Himalayan Battlefield of Soft Power:
    • In remote terrains where military posturing is limited, monasteries and monastic leadership serve as power brokers.
    • A lama’s allegiance can shift loyalty of an entire region, becoming a soft-power asset or liability.

Conclusion: Prayer Beads in the Place of Missiles

The Himalayas, often viewed through a strategic-military lens, are increasingly becoming a spiritual battleground where soft power equates to sovereignty. As China accelerates its religious diplomacy, India must shift from fragmented initiatives to a cohesive Buddhist strategy rooted in cultural leadership and cross-border outreach. The impending Dalai Lama succession will test India’s resolve, offering a rare chance to solidify its influence while fending off China’s encroachment through spiritual legitimacy. The future of Himalayan peace and identity might well depend on who controls the reincarnation narrative — not just in Lhasa, but across the clouds of the geopolitical Himalayas.

Relevant PYQs (Previous Year Questions):

  1. UPSC CSE Mains 2020 – GS Paper 2: “Soft power is an important aspect of India’s foreign policy.” Discuss India’s efforts in promoting cultural and spiritual diplomacy.
  2. UPSC CSE Mains 2018 – GS Paper 2: “India’s foreign policy has increasingly been shaped by its neighbourhood.” Analyse India’s evolving relations with Himalayan nations in light of rising Chinese influence.
  3. UPSC CSE Mains 2016 – GS Paper 2: “The Indian government must take proactive steps in strengthening its relations with neighbouring countries to counterbalance China.” Evaluate this statement in the context of India’s soft power.
  4. UPSC CSE Mains 2013 – GS Paper 2: Discuss the role of religious and cultural linkages in the evolution of India’s foreign policy with East and Southeast Asia.

Source: Nirupama Rao, China, India and the Conflict over Buddhism, The Hindu Editorial.

Introduction: Trade Diplomacy Meets Agricultural Sovereignty

India and the United States, despite their growing strategic convergence, continue to grapple with persistent deadlocks in bilateral trade negotiations, particularly over agriculture and automotive components. With deadlines nearing, both sides have yet to reconcile national priorities with global trade expectations. The crux of the disagreement lies in India’s protectionist stance on agriculture versus U.S. demands for market access, a dilemma with broader implications for future U.S. trade deals.

Body: The Agricultural Stalemate and Strategic Calculations

  1. India’s Firm Stand on Agricultural Protection:
  • India has consistently resisted opening its agriculture sector to foreign imports to safeguard the interests of domestic farmers.
  • Indian negotiators fear that any precedent of liberalisation could lead to increased vulnerabilities for small and marginal farmers, especially in sensitive sectors like dairy and cereals.
  1. U.S. Strategic Interests:
  • The U.S. views a trade deal with India as a template for future trade negotiations with the EU and Japan.
  • Excluding agriculture from the India deal could weaken the U.S. negotiating position globally, hence Washington’s insistence on market access.
  1. Trade Deal Uncertainty and Presidential Surprises:
  • Indian officials expect a potential surprise announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump, akin to similar moves in Vietnam and Indonesia.
  • These announcements were made unilaterally by the U.S. after personal conversations with respective heads of state, and did not reflect prior negotiation outcomes.
  1. Automotive Components: Another Sticky Point:
  • While India is cautious on agriculture, the U.S. refuses to reduce import duties on auto components to zero, another crucial hurdle delaying a comprehensive agreement.
  1. From Mini-Deal to Broader BTA:
  • Indian negotiators are now focusing on a broader Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), expected to mature by September or October, instead of rushing a mini-deal by August 1.
  • However, the door remains open for a last-minute deal driven by political optics rather than procedural consensus.

Conclusion: Balancing Trade with Domestic Interests

The India–U.S. trade deadlock, especially over agriculture, highlights the complex interplay of domestic imperatives and international diplomacy. India’s reluctance stems from its need to protect vulnerable agrarian communities, while the U.S. seeks consistency in its global trade posture. As negotiations oscillate between mini-deals and broader BTAs, the outcome will significantly influence not only bilateral economic ties but also the future architecture of global trade, particularly in sectors that intertwine sovereignty with sustainability.

Relevant PYQs (Previous Year Questions):

  1. UPSC CSE Mains 2021 – GS Paper 2: “India’s economic interests often conflict with its strategic partnerships.” Critically examine in the context of India–U.S. trade relations.
  2. UPSC CSE Mains 2020 – GS Paper 3: Discuss the impact of global trade agreements on the Indian agriculture sector. How can India balance WTO commitments with farmer welfare?
  3. UPSC CSE Mains 2018 – GS Paper 2: “India’s trade policies reflect the growing assertion of national interest in an interdependent world.” Analyze with examples.
  4. UPSC CSE Mains 2017 – GS Paper 2: Examine the role of bilateral and regional trade agreements in shaping India’s foreign policy.

Source: T.C.A. Sharad Raghavan, “India-U.S. Trade Deal: Deadlock continues over agriculture”, The Hindu Editorial.

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